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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new notion called Revocable-iffLinked Ring Signature (R-iff-L Ring Signature). In R-iff-L ring signatures, a signer can sign on behalf of the whole group, just like ordinary
ring signatures. However, if he signs twice or more, he can be linked and
his identity can be revoked by everyone. We formally define a new security model for the new notion in identity-based (ID-based) setting and
propose a constant-size ID-based construction, that is, the size of the
signature is independent of the size of the group.
In addition, we point out some possible attacks on linkable ring signature
with ID-based setting only and enhance the security model to cover
these attacks. We also propose an ID-based event-oriented linkable ring
signature scheme with constant size implementation.
Both schemes are provably secure in our new model.
Keywords:Anonymity, Linkable, Revocable, Ring Signature
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Introduction

Group-oriented cryptography refers to cryptographic systems in which a group
of users are involved. In schemes where participation of one or a proper subset
of members is required to complete a process, anonymity refers to whether participants are distinguishable from non-participants. According to [2], anonymity
for group-oriented cryptography can be divided into 7 different levels, namely,
Full Anonymity, Linkable Anonymity, Revocable-iff-Linked Anonymity, Revocable Anonymity, Linkable and Revocable Anonymity, Revocable-iff-Linked and

2

Man Ho Au, Joseph K. Liu, Willy Susilo, and T. H. Yuen

Revocable Anonymity and No Anonymity. Examples of group-oriented cryptographic schemes with different levels of anonymity are shown in the following
table while interested readers can refer to [2] for a more detailed discussion.

Anonymity Level
Full
Linkable
Revocable-iff-Linked
2-times
k-times

Full+OA
Link+OA

Examples
Ring Sign[14]
Anon Ident[9, 12]
Linkable Ring[11]
Eo-Linkable Ring[19]
E-Cash[6, 1],TbL[20]
this paper
Compact E-Cash[7]
k-TAA[16]
dynamic k-TAA[13]
constant-size K-TAA[17]
k-Times Group Signature [2]
Group Signatures
Fair E-Cash[8, 18]

Size Event-Oriented Ad-hoc
O(n)
N/A
X
O(1)
N/A
X
O(n)
×
X
O(n)
X
X
O(1)
O(1)
O(1)
O(k)
O(k)
O(1)
O(1)
O(1)
O(1)

×
X
×
X
X
X
X
×
×

×
X
×
×
X
×
×
×
×

Fig. 1. Examples of group-oriented cryptographic schemes with different levels of
anonymity.

Identity-based Cryptography. In 1984, Shamir [15] introduced the notion of
Identity-based (ID-based) cryptography to simplify certificate management. The
unique feature of ID-based cryptography is that a user’s public key can be any
arbitrary string. Since then, many other ID-based signature schemes have been
proposed, despite the fact that the first practical ID-based encryption appeared
only until 2001 [5]. In 2004, Bellare et al. [3] developed a framework to analyze
the security of ID-based signature schemes and they proved the security (or
insecurity) of 14 schemes found in the literature. As in the case of standard
signature, there are also blind signature [22], proxy signature [21], proxy blind
signature [10], ring signature [22] in the paradigm of ID-based cryptography.
In the case of ID-based ring signature, we have to take extra care for the
design of schemes. While some of the existing schemes provide anonymity unconditionally, others are computational only. The Private Key Generator (PKG)
itself may have extra advantage in breaking the anonymity since it is in possession of all the private keys. This problem does not sound serious in normal
ID-based ring signature scheme because almost all existing schemes is unconditionally anonymous. However, in the case of linkable ring signatures, it is still an
open problem to construct one with unconditional anonymity. Within the constraint of computational anonymity, it is a great challenge of providing privacy
in an ID-based setting (to the PKG). We require special attention in the design
of the scheme.
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Contribution

In this paper, we propose a new notion called Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature which belongs to the Revocable-iff-Linked Anonymity category. In addition,
we have the following contributions:
– We formally define a new security model for this notion, in an ID-based
setting.
– We provide a constant size concrete implementation. When compared with
the scheme in [2], we do not require any setup or group manager. The formation is spontaneous and is suitable for ad-hoc environment, which is a nice
inherited property of ring signature.
– We propose a constant size ID-based ring signature scheme which is secure
in the enhanced security model.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follow. The enhanced security models of ID-based Linkable Ring Signature scheme and ID-based Revocableiff-Linked Ring Signature scheme are given in Section 3. Our concrete implementations are presented in Section 4. We conclude the paper in Section 5.

2
2.1

Preliminaries
Notations

Let ê be a bilinear map such that ê : G1 × G2 → GT .
–
–
–
–
–
–

G1 and G2 are cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p.
each element of G1 , G2 and GT has unique binary representation.
g0 , h0 are generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
ψ : G2 → G1 is a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 , with ψ(h0 ) = g0 .
(Bilinear) ∀x ∈ G1 , y ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp , ê(xa , y b ) = ê(x, y)ab .
(Non-degenerate)ê(g0 , h0 ) 6= 1.

G1 and G2 can be same or different groups. We say that two groups (G1 , G2 )
are a bilinear group pair if the group action in G1 , G2 , the isomorphism ψ and
the bilinear mapping ê are all efficiently computable.
2.2

Mathematical Assumptions

Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm). The Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem
in G is defined as follows: On input a tuple (Y, g) ∈ G2 such that |G| = p for
some prime p, output a ∈ Zp such that Y = g a . We say that the (t, )-DDH
assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least  in solving
the DL problem in G.

4

Man Ho Au, Joseph K. Liu, Willy Susilo, and T. H. Yuen

Definition 2 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman). The Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) problem in G is defined as follows: On input a quadruple (g, h, g a , T ) ∈
G4 such that |G| = p for some prime p, output 1 if T = ha and 0 otherwise.
We say that the (t, )-DDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has
advantage at least  over random guessing in solving the DDH problem in G.
Definition 3 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman). The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (qSDH) problem in (G1 , G2 ) is defined as follow: On input a (q + 2)-tuple (g0 , h0 ,
2
q
hx0 , hx0 , · · · , hx0 ) ∈ G1 × Gq+1
, output a pair (A, c) such that A(x+c) = g0 where
2
∗
c ∈ Zp . We say that the (q, t, )-SDH assumption holds in (G1 , G2 ) if no t-time
algorithm has advantage at least  in solving the q-SDH problem in (G1 , G2 ).
The q-SDH assumption is shown to be true in the generic group model [4].

3
3.1

Security Model
Definition

The security definition of ID-Based Linkable Ring Signature and ID-Based Revocableiff-Linked Ring Signature are very similar. Therefore we describe the security notions of them together, and their differences are specified at appropriate places.
An ID-Based Linkable (or Revocable-iff-Linked) Ring Signature scheme is a
tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms below:
– Setup. On input an unary string 1λ where λ is a security parameter, the
algorithm outputs a master secret key s and a list of system parameters
param that includes λ and the descriptions of a user secret key space D, a
message space M as well as a signature space Ψ .
– Extract. On input a list param of system parameters, an identity IDi ∈
{0, 1}∗ for a user and the master secret key s, the algorithm outputs the
user’s secret key di ∈ D. When we say identity IDi corresponds to user
secret key di or vice versa, we mean the pair (IDi , di ) is an input-output
pair of Extract with respect to param and s. Usually this algorithm is
executed by a trusted party called Private Key Generator (PKG).
– Sign. On input a list param of system parameters, a group size n of length
polynomial in λ, a set {IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ |i ∈ [1, n]} of n user identities, a
message m ∈ M, and a secret key {dj ∈ D|j ∈ [1, n]}, the algorithm outputs
an ID-based linkable (or revocable-iff-linked) ring signature σ ∈ Ψ .
– Verify. On input a list param of system parameters, a group size n of
length polynomial in λ, a set {IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ |i ∈ [1, n]} of n user identities,
a message m ∈ M, a signature σ ∈ Ψ , it outputs either valid or invalid.
– Link. On input two signatures σ1 , σ2 ∈ Ψ , it outputs either link or unlink.
– Revoke. (For ID-based revocable-iff-linked ring signature only.) On input
two signatures σ1 , σ2 ∈ Ψ such that link ← Link(σ1 , σ2 ), it outputs ID.
Correctness. An ID-Based Linkable Ring Signature scheme should satisfy:

Constant-Size ID-Based Linkable and Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature

5

– Verification Correctness – Signatures signed by honest signers are verified
to be invalid with negligible probability.
– Linking Correctness – If two signatures are linked, they must be generated
from the same secret key of the same signer.
For ID-Based Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature, the Revoking Correctness
requires that the output of Revoke of two linked signatures must be the actual
signer.
3.2

Security Requirement of ID-based Linkable Ring Signature

A secure ID-Based Linkable Ring Signature scheme should possess unforgeability,
anonymity, linkability and non-slanderability which will be defined below.
Unforgeability. An adversary should not be able to forge any signature just
from the identities of the group members. We specify a security model which
mainly captures the following two attacks:
1. Adaptive chosen message attack
2. Adaptive chosen identity attack
Adaptive chosen message attack allows an adversary to obtain message-signature
pairs on demand during the forging attack. Adaptive chosen identity attack
allows the adversary to forge a signature with respect to a group chosen by the
adversary. To support adaptive chosen message attack, we provide the adversary
the following oracle queries.
– Extraction oracle (EO): On input IDi , di ← Extract(param, IDi , s) is
returned . The oracle is stateful, meaning that if IDi = IDj , then di = dj .
– Signing oracle (SO): A chooses a group of n identities {IDi }i∈[1,n] , a
signer identity IDj among them and a message m, the oracle outputs a
valid ID-based linkable (or revocable-iff-linked) ring signature denoted by
σ ← Sign(param, n, {IDi |i ∈ [1, n]}, m, dj ). The signing oracle may query
the extraction oracle during its operation.
– Hash oracle (H): A can ask for the values of the hash functions for any
input.
We have the following unforgeability game:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs Setup
to generate the public parameters param and master secret key s. The adversary A is given param.
2. A can make a polynomial number of oracle queries to EO, SO and H adaptively.
3. A outputs a signature σ ∗ for message m∗ and ring L∗ .
A wins the above game if
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1. Verify(param, |L∗ |, L∗ , m∗ , σ ∗ ) = valid;
2. (L∗ , m∗ ) and σ ∗ should not be in the set of oracle queries and replies between
A and SO; and
3. A did not query EO on any identity ID ∈ L∗ .
The advantage of A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Definition 4 (Unforgeability). A scheme is unforgeable if no PPT adversary
has non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
L-Anonymity. An adversary should not be able to tell the identity of the
signer with a probability larger than 1/n, where n is the cardinality of the ring.
A crucial difference between Anonymity for ring signatures and L-Anonymity
for linkable ring signatures is that in the latter, the adversary cannot query
signatures of a user who appears in the challenge phase. The rationale is that if
the adversary obtains signature of user i, it can tell if the challenge signature is
generated by this user due to the linking property.
Different from a non-ID-based linkable ring signature scheme, the PKG who
knows the master secret key (thus it knows the secret key of every user), may gain
advantage on the anonymity of a signature. In order to capture this potential
attack, we enhance our model in a way that the adversary is also given the
master secret key.
In order to capture the potential attack, we further define the following oracle:
– Reversed Extraction oracle (REO): The only difference between REO
and the traditional EO is that, it is simulated by the adversary instead of the
simulator. The initial request can be made by the adversary if the extracted
protocol is an interactive one. In this case, the simulator acts as an honest
user to provide interactions and the oracle records the necessary transcript
of the interaction. Note that this maybe different from the final output of
the interaction protocol due to some secret information which is only known
to the honest user.
We have the following anonymity game:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs Setup
to generate the public parameters param and master secret key s. The adversary A is given param and s.
2. A can make a polynomial number of oracle queries to REO, SO and H
adaptively.
3. In the challenge phase, A picks two identities ID1∗ , ID2∗ , which are not
queried to the SO as a signer. A also picks a message m∗ and a set of
n identities L∗ . Then A receives a challenge signature σ ∗ = Sign(param, n +
2, L∗ ∪ {ID1∗ , ID2∗ }, m∗ , dIDb∗ ), where b ∈ {0, 1}.
4. A can queries oracles REO, SO and H adaptively, where ID1∗ , ID2∗ are not
queried to the SO as a signer.
5. Finally A outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}.
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A wins the above game if b = b0 . The advantage of A is defined as the
probability that A wins minus 1/2.
Definition 5 (Anonymity). A scheme is anonymous if no PPT adversary has
non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
Note 1: Although the adversary has the master secret key and it can generate
an additional secret key for ID1∗ or ID2∗ , this secret key is different from the
one owned by ID1∗ or ID2∗ (generated by REO). According to our definition of
Linking Correctness, those signatures generated by these two secret keys cannot
be linked, although they are corresponding to the same identity.
Linkability. An adversary should not be able to form two signatures with the
same secret key without being linked by the Link protocol.
We have the following linkability game:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs Setup
to generate the public parameters param and master secret key s. The adversary A is given param.
2. A can make a polynomial number of oracle queries to EO, SO and H adaptively.
3. A outputs signatures σi∗ for messages m∗i and rings L∗i for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Let C be the set of identities queried to EO. A wins the above game if:
–
–
–
–

σ0 and σ1 are not outputs from SO.
Verify(param, |L∗i |, L∗i , m∗i , σi∗ ) = valid for i ∈ {0, 1};
Link(σ0∗ , σ1∗ ) = Unlink; and
|(L∗0 ∪ L∗1 ) ∩ C| ≤ 1.

The advantage of A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Definition 6 (Linkability). A scheme is linkable if no PPT adversary has
non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
Non-slanderability. Informally speaking, non-slanderability ensure that no adversary, can frame an honest user for signing a signature. That is, an adversary
cannot produce a valid signature that is linked to a signature generated by a
user. In addition to the above oracles, we define one more:
– Challenged Signing oracle (CSO): The only difference between CSO and
the traditional SO is that, it requires the simulator to use the secret key
queried from the REO and execute Sign algorithm specified in the scheme
to generate the signature. REO should be queried before if necessary.
Formally it is defined as follow:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs Setup
to generate param and master secret key s. S sends param and s to the
adversary A.
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2. A makes a polynomial number of oracle queries to REO and H in an adaptive
manner.
3. A submits a polynomial number of oracle queries to CSO adaptively for
generating challenged signatures.
4. A outputs a signature σ ∗ for message m∗ and ring L∗ .
A wins the game if
– Verify(param, |L∗ |, L∗ , m∗ , σ ∗ ) returns valid.
– σ ∗ is not an output of any CSO query.
– Link(σ ∗ , σ̂) = Link where σ̂ is any signature outputted from CSO.
Definition 7 (Non-slanderability). A scheme is non-slanderability if no PPT
adversary has non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
Note 2: Although the adversary may initialize the query of REO, it cannot get
the user secret key since it does not know some secret information which is only
known to the honest user (that is, the simulator in this game). Thus it cannot
generate a signature by that particular secret key which is linked together with
some signatures outputted by CSO. In addition, the remark of Note 1 also applies
here.
Theorem 1. For an ID-based linkable ring signature scheme, if it is linkable
and non-slanderable, it implies that it is unforgeable.
Proof. (sketch) We assume that the scheme is linkable and non-slanderable. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can forge the signature with non-negligible
probability. A plays the game in Linkability. It submits one query to EO and
produces a signature using this secret key. It forges another signature with another identity as the actual signer. Obviously these two signatures are unlink.
That is, it breaks linkability, contradicts our assumption.
t
u
3.3

Security Requirement of ID-based Revocable-iff-Linkable Ring
Signature

The definitions of unforgeability and anonymity are the same as ID-based Linkable Ring Signature defined in Section 3.2. We skip here.
Revoke-iff-Linkability. An adversary should not be able to form two signatures
with the same secret key without being linked by the Link protocol or pointed
to a user outside the rings.
We have the following linkability game:
1. A simulator S takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and runs Setup
to generate the public parameters param and master secret key s. The adversary A is given param.
2. A can make a polynomial number of oracle queries to EO, SO and H adaptively.
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3. A outputs signatures σi∗ for messages m∗i and rings L∗i for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Let C be the set of identities queried to EO. A wins the above game if it
fulfils either condition:
– σ0 and σ1 are not outputs from SO.
– Verify(param, |L∗i |, L∗i , m∗i , σi∗ ) = valid for i ∈ {0, 1};
– Link(σ0∗ , σ1∗ ) = Unlink; and
– |(L∗0 ∪ L∗1 ) ∩ C| ≤ 1.
OR
2. – σ0 and σ1 are not outputs from SO.
– Verify(param, |L∗i |, L∗i , m∗i , σi∗ ) = valid for i ∈ {0, 1};
– Link(σ0∗ , σ1∗ ) = Link; and
– Revoke(σ0∗ , σ1∗ ) = ID0 where ID0 ∈
/ {L∗0 ∪ L∗1 } or ID0 has not been
inputted to EO.

1.

The advantage of A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Definition 8 (Revoke-iff-Linkability). A scheme is revocable-iff-linked if no
PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in winning the above game.
Non-slanderability. The non-slanderability includes the one defined above in
Section 3.2 (Def. 7) and the definition of Revoke-iff-linkability (Def. 8).
Definition 9 (Non-slanderability). A scheme is non-slanderable if no PPT
adversary has non-negligible advantage in winning the games defined in Def. 7
and Def. 8.

4
4.1

Our Proposed Schemes
Construction

System Setup:
– Init (Common parameter): Let λ be the security parameter. Let (G1 , G2 )
be a bilinear group pair with computable isomorphism ψ such that |G1 | =
|G2 | = p for some prime p of λ bits. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp , be a cryptographic hash function. Also assume Gp be a group of order p where DDH
is intractable. Let g0 , g1 , g2 be generators of G1 , h0 , h1 , h2 be generators of
group G2 such that ψ(hi ) = gi for i = 0, 1, 2 and u0 , u1 , u2 be generators
of Gp such that relative discrete logarithm of the generators are unknown.
This can be done by setting the generators to be output of a hash function
of some publicly known seed.
– Init (Accumulator): Choose a generator h of G2 . Randomly select q ∈R Z∗p
i
and compute qi = h(q ) for i = 1 · · · tmax , where tmax is the maximum
number of accumulation.
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PKG Setup: The PKG randomly selects γ ∈R Z∗p and compute w = h0 γ . The
master secret is γ while the public parameters are (H, ψ, G1 , G2 , Gp , p, g0 , g1 , g2 , h0 ,
h1 , h2 , u0 , u1 , u2 , h, q1 , . . . , qtmax , w).

Extract: User with identity IDu obtain the corresponding secret key from PKG
through the following interactive protocol.
0

1. User with identity IDu randomly selects s0 , rs ∈R Z∗p and sends C 0 = g1s g2rs ,
0
along with the proof Π0 = SP K{(s0 , rs ) : C 0 = g1s g2rs } to PKG.
2. PKG verifies that Π0 is valid. If it is valid, it randomly selects s00 ∈R Z∗p and
computes
00

C = C 0 g1s

e = H(IDu )

1

A = (g0 C) e+γ

and sends (A, e, s00 ) to the user.
3. User computes s = s0 + s00 and checks if e(A, whe0 ) = e(g0 g1s g2rs , h0 ). It then
stores (A, e, s, rs ).

Sign(Link Version): For signing a message M , compute
Qk=|{ID}|

v=h

k=1

(q+H(IDk ))

Qk=|{ID}|

vw = h

k=1,k6=u

(H(IDk )+q)

S = u0 s

e+q
SP K{(A, e, s, rs , vw ) : Ae+γ = g0 g1s g2rs ∧ vw
= v ∧ S = u0 s }(M )

This can be efficiently constructed as a discrete-log relation SPK, by randomly generating some variables r1 , r2 , re ∈R Z∗p and computing
A1 = g1 e g2re , A2 = Ag2 r1 , A3 = vw g2 r2 ,
α1 = r1 e, α2 = r2 e, α3 = r1 re , α4 = r2 re ,
and producing the following non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge:
π1 := SP K{(r1 , r2 , re , α1 , α2 , α3 , α4 , e, s, rs ) :
A1 = g1e g2re ∧ Ar11 = g1α1 g2α3 ∧ Ar12 = g1α2 g2α4 ∧ S = us0 ∧
e(A2 , w)
= e(g1 , h0 )s e(g2 , h0 )rs e(g2 , w)r1 e(g2 , h0 )α1 e(A2 , h0 )−e
e(g0 , h0 )
e(A3 , q1 )
= e(g2 , q1 )r2 e(g2 , h)α2 e(A3 , h)−e }(M )
e(v, h)
The signature on M is parsed as (S, A1 , A2 , A3 , π1 ). Note that S is the linkability tag. This can be turned into event-oriented version by replacing u0 with
G(event) where G is some suitable hash function. The signature contains S and
the transcript of the SPK.
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Sign(Revocable-iff-Link Version): Same as above except adding an extra
component T . Specifically, create a signature as in the link version (S, A1 , A2 , A3 , π1 )
on message M . Let R = H(S||A1 ||A2 ||A3 ||π1 ||M ), compute T = ue0 uRs
1 and make
a proof that T is correctly formed.
This can be done via the following non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-ofknowledge:
s
π2 := SP K{(e, re , s) : A1 = g1e g2re ∧ S = us0 ∧ T = ue0 (uR
1 ) }(M )

Parse the signature on M as (S, T, A1 , A2 , A3 , π1 , π2 ).
Verify: In the link version, parse the signature as (S, A1 , A2 , A3 , π1 ). Verify the
SPK π1 .
In the revocable-iff-link version, parse the signature as (S, T, A1 , A2 , A3 , π1 , π2 ).
Compute R = H(S||A1 ||A2 ||A3 ||π1 ||M ) and verify the SPK π1 and π2 .
Link: Two signatures are linked if the share the same link tag S.
Revoke: Given two signatures (S, T, A1 , A2 , A3 , π1 , π2 ) and (S, T 0 , A01 , A02 , A03 , π10 , π20 )
on messages M from ring L and M 0 from ring L0 respectively, computes R =
H(S||A1 ||A2 ||A3 ||π1 ||M ) and R0 = H(S||A01 ||A02 ||A03 ||π10 ||M 0 ). Compute U =
R0

1

H(ID)

( TT 0 R )( R0 −R ) . For each identity ID in L∩L0 , output ID if and only if U = u0

.

We present the following theorem regarding the security of our scheme, whose
proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Our scheme Link version (resp. Revocalbe-iff-Link version) possesses unforgeability, anonymity, linkability (resp. revocable-iff-linkability) and
non-slanderability if the q-SDH assumption holds in (G1 , G2 ) and the DL assumption holds in Gp in the random oracle model.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a new notion called Revocable-iff-Linked Ring Signature. We define a new model in an ID-based setting and provide a constant-size
concrete implementation. We also propose an ID-based linkable ring signature
scheme with constant size space complexity.
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A

Security Analysis

The Revocable-iff-Link Version can be regarded as a generalization of the Link
Version. Thus we only show the security analysis of the Revocable-iff-Link Version. In rest of this section, we refer “our scheme” as the proposed ID-Based
Revocable-iff-Link Ring Signature scheme.
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Theorem 3. Our scheme is anonymous if the DDH assumption in Gp holds in
the random oracle model.
Proof. (sketch.) By the zero-knowledge property of the SPK in Sign, the parameters computed inside the SPK protocol reveal no information about the signer
identity. Therefore only the parameters (A1 , A2 , A3 , S, T ) may reveal such information.
Note that A1 is a commitment of e = H(IDu ), where IDu is the identity
of the signer. Due to the hiding property of the commitment scheme, A1 leaks
no information about e. Specifically, for any value of e, there exists a value re
such that A1 = g1e g2re . Likewise, for any values A and vw , there exists r1 , r2 such
that A2 = Ag2r1 and A3 = vw g2r2 . Thus, (A1 , A2 , A3 ) leaks no information to the
adversary as well.
Indeed, the only values containing information about the signer is S and
T , which are essential since they provide sufficient information for anyone to
identify the signer should he sign twice. However, given a single pair of S and
T , the identity of the signer is hidden under the DDH assumption in Gp .
Specifically, let S be a simulator whose input is u0 , u1 , us0 , T and its task is
?

to determine if T = us1 . S employs the zero-knowledge simulator to simulator
all the reversed extraction oracle queries. Then at the challenge phase, S picks
b ∈R {0, 1}. Suppose the challenge identity is IDb∗ . If IDb∗ corresponds to an
reverse extraction oracle query with transcript involving values (C 0 , s00 , C, e =
H(IDb∗ ), A), S simulates the challenge signature as if IDb∗ is having a secret key
of (A, e, s, rs ). Note that in the view of the adversary, it is entirely correct as for
00
any value s, there exists value rs such that C = C 0 g1s = g1s g2rs . S then sets the
value S = us0 , T = ue0 T R and some random values A1 , A2 , A3 , and simulates π1
and π2 . S returns (A1 , A2 , A3 , S, T, π1 , π2 ) as the challenge signature. If A finally
outputs b0 = b, then S outputs 1 for the DDH problem. Otherwise, S outputs 0.
Note that if T = us1 , the challenge signature is a correct signature produced
by the secret key (A, e, s, rs ) which belongs to IDb∗ . Otherwise, it contains no
information about IDb∗ in the view of the adversary and thus based on the
success of A, S can solve the DDH problem.
Theorem 4. Our scheme is non-slanderable if the q-SDH assumption in holds
in (G1 , G2 ) and the DL assumption holds in Gp in the random oracle model.
According to definition 9, our scheme is non-slanderable if there is no PPT
adversary can win the game in definition 7 and definition 8.
Lemma 1. There is no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in winning
the game defined in definition 7 if the DL assumption holds in Gp in the random
oracle model.
Proof. (Sketch.) We first simulate the game in definition 7. Assume an adversary
A exists. We are going to construct another PPT S that makes use of A to solve
the DL problem. S is given the tuple (S ∗ , u∗ ) and its task is to output s such
that S ∗ = u∗ s .
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S generates the parameters honestly except u0 , u1 is set to be u∗ , u∗ µ for
some random value µ ∈R Zp . The parameters and master secret key are given
to A.
S simulates all the REO and CSO queries using the zero-knowledge simulator. S randomly picks one of the identity IDi in an REO query, and suppose the
transcript involving values (C 0 , s00 , C, e = H(IDi ), A), S simulates this user as
if it is having a secret key of (A, e, s, rs ), where s is value of discrete logarithm
S wish to compute. The view provided to A is correct, since for any value of s,
00
there exists a value rs such that C = C 0 g1s = g1s g2rs . In an CSO query involving
user IDi , S sets S = S ∗ , T = ue0 S ∗ Rµ , A1 , A2 , A3 to be random values and
simulates the signature using the zero-knowledge simulator.
Finally, A returns a valid signature σ ∗ , which is not the output from CSO,
but is linked to one of them. If it is linked to the signature created from IDi , S
rewinds and extracts the SPK to obtain s. Then S returns s as the solution of
the DL problem.
Lemma 2. There is no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in winning
the game defined in definition 8 if the q-SDH assumption in holds in (G1 , G2 )
in the random oracle model.
Proof. We then simulate the game in definition 8. Assume an adversary A exists.
We construct another PPT S that makes use of A to solve the q-SDH problem.
xq

x

Setup. S receives a q-SDH tuple (g10 , g20 , g20 , . . . , g20 ). S randomly picks e1 , . . . eq−1 ∈
Qq−1
Z∗p and computes f (x) = i=1 (x+ei ). If x = −ei for some i, S solves the q-SDH
problem directly.
S uses the q-SDH tuple to compute:
h0 = g20

f (x)

w = g20

,

xf (x)

,

g0 = ψ(h0 ).

S picks e∗ , a∗ , k ∗ ∈ Z∗p and computes:
∗

∗

∗

(e∗ +x)k∗ −1
a∗

1/a
h1 = [(whe0 )k h−1
= h0
0 ]

,

g1 = ψ(h1 ).

S randomly picks µ ∈ Z∗p , h ∈ G2 , sets g2 = g0µ and sets qi accordingly. S
computes:
1/x+ei

Ai = g0

= ψ(g20

f (x)/x+ei

)

for 1 ≤ i ≤ q. A is given param = (g0 , g1 , g2 , h0 , w, h, q1 , . . . , qtmax ). For simplicity, denote e∗ = eq .
Oracle Simulation. B simulates the extraction and signing oracles as follow:
(Hash oracle.) A new hash oracle query H(ID) will return a new ei that has
never been returned by the hash oracle.
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(Extraction oracle.) S runs the Extract protocol with A, rewinds and extracts
(s0 , rs ). For i = 1, . . . , q − 1, S randomly picks s00 ∈ Z∗p and computes:
A = (g0 Cg2rs )1/x+ei
1+rs µ+

= (g0

1+rs µ−

= Ai

(s0 +s00 )[(e∗ +x)k∗ −1]
a∗

(s0 +s00 )
a∗

)1/x+ei

(s0 +s00 )k∗ (e∗ +x)
a∗ (ei +x)

g0

(s0 +s00 )
(1+rs µ− a∗ )

= Ai

(s0 +s00 )k∗
a∗

g0

∗
(1− eei −e
+x )
i

(s0 +s00 )k∗ (ei −e∗ )
(s0 +s00 )
(1+rs µ− a∗ −
)
a∗

= Ai

(s0 +s00 )k∗
a∗

g0



S returns (A, ei , s00 ) to A.
∗
For i = n, S returns (An = g0k , en , s00 = a∗ − s0 ) to A.
(Signing oracle.) S uses the zero-knowledge simulator of the SPK in Sign to
answer these queries.
Output Calculation. If A wins in the game in definition 8, A returns a signature
σi∗ for message m∗i and ring L∗i for i = 0, 1. Assume A wins by condition 1 of
definition 8, then A must not query KEO for one ID∗ before. WLOG, assume
A didn’t query for ID0 . S extract the witnesses (A, e, s, rs , vw ) from the SPK
in σi∗ . These set of witnesses satisfies the following relationship based on the
soundness of the SPK.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ae+x = g0 g1s g2rs
e+q
vw
=v
S = u0 s
T = u0 e uRs
1
We have the following possibilities:

– Case 1: e ∈
/ {e1 , . . . , en }. Then S computes:
1+rs µ+

Ae+x = g0 g1s g2rs = g0
a∗ +rs µa∗ −s
a∗ (e+x)

A = g0



∗

− sk
a∗

B = Ag0

 a∗ +r

s[(e∗ +x)k∗ −1]
a∗

sk∗

g0a∗

∗
(1− e−e

e+x )

a∗
s µa∗ −s−sk∗ (e−e∗ )

S returns (B, e) as a new SDH pair.
– Case 2: e = ei and A 6= Ai for some i. With probability 1/q, e = e∗ , S
computes as in case 1:
a∗ +rs µa∗ −s
a∗ (e+x)

A = g0

∗

− sk
a∗

B = Ag0

S returns (B, e) as a new SDH pair.



sk∗

g0a∗



∗
 a∗ +raµa
∗ −s
s
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– Case 3: e = ei and A0 = Ai for some i. We must have Aiei +x g1−s g2rs =
rs
Aei i +x g1−si g2 i which implies that s + µrs = si + µrsi . If A wins in this
situation, S can be set up easily to solve the DL of g2 to base g1 and thus
this case happens with negligible probability under the DL assumption.
From the new SDH pair, we can solve the q-SDH problem. We have:
B = g10

f (x)/(x+e)

= g10

Pq−1
i=0

ci xi +c−1 /(x+e)

where c−1 , c0 , . . . , cq−1 can be computed by S with c−1 6= 0. Then S get:
1/(x+e)
g10

= B

q−1
Y

xi

ψ(g20 )−ci

1/c−1

i=0

which is the solution to the q-SDH problem.
Now assume A wins by condition 2 of definition 8. If ID0 ∈
/ {L∗0 ∪ L∗1 }, then
it contradicts the soundness property of the SPK.
Thus, our construction is non-slanderable if DL assumption holds in Gp and
q-SDH assumption holds in (G1 , G2 ) in the random oracle model.

